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INTRODUCTION
The Middle East has long been a hot bed of conflict, as at least three main
religions cite it as their birthplace.1 While the Christians were intimately involved in the
conflicts during the Crusades, the Muslims and Jews have clashed most recently
regarding the former British Palestine.2
The hostilities have engendered a cycle of violence that has further devolved into
disparate acts, which have resulted in crimes against humanity. These include: [1]
Murder, [2] Torture, [3] Deportation, and [4] Persecution.3 These crimes were not simply
single acts, but rather they are systematic and widespread attacks that attained a certain
level of mens rea.4 In response, both the Palestinian authorities and citizens and what are
now the Israeli government and its citizens have grown more intransigent in their beliefs
and more desperate in their responses. Peace negotiations have failed repeatedly in the
midst of rising humanitarian costs.5
Further, a peace process that would help address the perpetration of crimes
against humanity in Israel and the Occupied Territories has not been achieved due to a
lack of commitment by the parties and the lack of a specific proposal that both sides can
J.D., 2004, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; B.A., 2001, The Canisius College. The author would
like to thank Lauren S. Mitchell for here gracious assistance and dedicated support.
1
Arshad Khan, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: A Common Tradition, REV. OF RELIGIONS (Oct. 1992),
available at www.alislam.org/library/links/00000129.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
2
Gajendra Singh, Roots of the Palestine Problem and New Road Map, S. ASIA ANALYSIS GROUP, available
at www.saag.org/papers8/paper727.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
3
Violence to Life, Health, and Physical or Mental well-being of persons (ICTR), Collective Punishments
(ICTR), Terrorism (ICTR), Outrages upon personal dignity…humiliating and degrading treatment (ICTR).
4
JASON S. ABRAMS & STEVEN R. RATNER, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 70 (2d Ed. 2001).
5
Arafat Urged to Act for Peace, BBC NEWS, May 3, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1963469.stm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).

agree upon. The commission of crimes against humanity has not slowed since the first
Intifada.6 And, putting a stop to these crimes rests on the possibility of creating a lasting
peace, a lasting peace, which may only be brought about with a holistic approach that
addresses the peace process, security issues, and system-wide justice for crimes against
humanity. The processes used in Northern Ireland can serve as a model in realizing peace
under these circumstances.
Northern Ireland has been involved in analogous conflicts for much of recent
history. The Northern Irish Catholics have fought what they term as British and
Protestant aggression and occupation, while the British and the Protestants have fought
what they see as terrorism.7 The recent successes with the Belfast Agreement8 can be
applied loosely to the Israeli/Palestinian situation as a remedy and answer to these crimes
against humanity.
Part I of this paper discusses the background of each situation, which led to the
humanitarian dilemmas in both Northern Ireland and Israel. Part II discusses the basis for
international and crimes against humanity law. In addition, it describes the crimes that
potentially could be proven in a situation arguably wrought with terrorism and
governmental aggression, such as the Northern Ireland and Israel experiences. In Part III,
this article discusses the breakdown of the peace process in Northern Ireland and in
Israel, their similarities, and how these breakdowns have hindered recourse for past
6

In Arabic, “Intifada” (
) is defined as “abrupt and sudden waking up from sleep or unconcerned
status.” The Intifada in Palestine: Introduction, INTIFADA.COM, available at
http://intifada.com/palestine.html (last visited April 30, 2004).In terms of its political meaning, it has come
to be associated with the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. Id. As an uprising, it began in
1987. Mitchell Bard, The Intifada, AMERICAN-ISRAELI COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE, available at www.usisrael.org/jsource/History/intifada.html (last visited April 30, 2004).
7
See Real Irish Republican Army, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, available at
www.fas.org/irp/world/para/nira.htm (last visited April 30, 2004).
8
Remarks by David Trimble, First Minister, Northern Ireland Assembly, to the New Atlantic Initiative,
FED. NEWS SERV. (Nov. 19, 2002).

2

crimes against humanity and created new ones. Part IV suggests a solution to address
crimes against humanity by preventing further crimes, by providing recourse and remedy
for past crimes and by permitting reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian
peoples. Part V concludes that a solution to Israel’s havoc is possible, but any plan to
achieve lasting peace must address peace, security and justice.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has been plagued by separation and discrimination since Henry

VIII imposed Protestantism on the nation.9 Religious rebellions destabilized the area
throughout the 1600s and again in the late 1700s. Protestants benefited greatly from the
Industrial Revolution, while Catholics in Northern Ireland continued to live in an agrarian
society.10 Discrimination was on the rise as a result of the success of the Protestants.
From the mid-1800s to the start of World War I, nationalists fought to get a Home Rule
Bill passed.11 Such a bill would remove a measure of British governmental control over
Northern Ireland. A Home Rule Bill was finally passed in 1912, but by then home rule
was no longer enough to satisfy the nationalists.12
Violence broke out under the leadership of Sinn Fein in 1916. The Easter uprising
was met with 30,000 British troops to stop 1,200 nationalists.13 For the most part,
Protestants felt no ill effects from the uprising, while Catholics had their church services
9
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cancelled and their stores closed.14 Three years later, Sinn Fein representatives declared
that Ireland was a republic.15 In 1921 a treaty was signed, creating a twenty-six county
Irish Free State, while six counties remained a part of the United Kingdom.16
Similar to movements in other countries around the world at the time, civil rights
demonstrations were being held in Northern Ireland in protest to the never-ending
discrimination against Catholics in regards to housing, voting and employment.17 Riots
and violence followed. The Bloody Sunday tragedy occurred in 1972 when British troops
shot and killed “13 apparently unarmed civilians” who had been participants in an illegal
march.18 In 1974, there was an attempt at power-sharing, but it lasted a mere five
months.19 Despite that brief period, Northern Ireland remained under direct rule until the
Northern Ireland Executive (established in the Belfast Agreement) took over in 1999.20

B.

Israel
Discussion of the creation of a Jewish state began before the atrocities of World

War II. A Jewish state had not existed since the middle of the first century when the
Diaspora scattered the Jewish people around the world.21 The Balfour Declaration of
1917 outlined British dedication to the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine
(which was a British mandate at the time). The declaration also affirmed that such an
establishment should not in any way cause detriment to the non-Jewish people living in
14
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Palestine.22 The indigenous population of Palestine was extremely opposed to the
“Zionist programme.”23 Revolts by the Arabs followed, which were brutally crushed by
the British.24
Years followed without the formation of a Jewish state, but the events that
occurred in Europe during World War II set the wheels in motion. The horrors of the
Holocaust made the West far more sympathetic to the cause of a Jewish homeland.
Locations other than Palestine were considered, but rejected.25 The Palestinian people
“rejected the idea, accepted as natural in the West, that they had a moral obligation to
sacrifice their land to compensate for the crimes committed by Europeans against
Jews.”26 The position of the Palestinians was inconsequential to those making the
decision and in November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly passed a
resolution that called for the division of the Palestinian mandate into two states – one
Jewish and the other Arab.27 General Assembly resolutions are largely regarded as nonbinding,28 but by May 1948 the Jewish state had come into existence. War immediately
followed. Armies from the surrounding Arab states invaded the new state, but were
defeated. After the war, Israel had claimed more territory than had originally been
reserved for it. In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was created to
give the Palestinian people an independent voice.29 Three years later, in 1967, a war
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lasting only six days would have a great effect on the region. It was during this war that
Israel seized Gaza and Sinai from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria, which
doubled the amount of land under Israeli control.30 The region was again destabilized
with the Yom Kippur War in 1973. “Unable to regain the territory they had lost in 1967
by diplomatic means, Egypt and Syria launched major offensives against Israel on the
Jewish festival of the Day of Atonement or Yom Kippur.”31 Israel was again successful
in defeating their Arab neighbors.
The Israeli army went on the offensive in 1982 with its invasion of Lebanon. The
operation was intended to crush Palestinian guerillas.32 This dealt a huge blow to
innocent Palestinians living in refugee camps in neighboring countries. Their safety was
far from guaranteed.33 From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, an Intifada broke out in
protest to the Israeli occupation of Gaza.34 The Intifada is most remembered for the
Palestinian protesters who threw stones at the Israeli forces.35 Several attempts at peace
failed following the Intifada. In 2000, Ariel Sharon’s presence at a holy site for Muslims
and Jews in Jerusalem propelled the region into another Intifada.
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II.
A.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

Basis for Crimes Against Humanity
“The principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires that the crimes at issue be

judged solely from the perspective of the law in force” at the time of their commission.36
This notion has been at odds with that of crimes against humanity from the time of their
first application during the Nuremberg Trials. At that time, crimes against humanity
embarked on a journey from the ivory towers of universities to the lookout towers of
battlefields, as a natural law idea developed in the wake of the atrocities of World War II
(WWII). Crimes against humanity have been said to be “deemed unjustifiable at all
times and in all circumstances.”37
The Nuremberg Trials were established by the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, in 1945, at the close of WWII,

38

for “just and prompt trial and

punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.”39 This Charter defined
crimes against humanity as:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
40
where perpetrated.

Subsequently, international tribunals were instituted in order to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law within the former
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).41 Both of the tribunals utilized the following
litany of offenses in terming crimes against humanity as acts “when committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.”42
Additional expansion of the codified law, through customary international law, has
eliminated the requirement of “a nexus to armed conflict”43 in the context of crimes
against humanity.44 However, the ICTR Statute replaced that phrase with a requirement
that “crimes be committed in a widespread or systematic manner” and be “motivated by
‘national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds’” to meet the crimes against
humanity standard.45 For example, a person accused of a crime against humanity must
have done so “with the requisite intent and he must be aware of the context within which
his acts are committed.”46
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In addition, the International Law Commission, in its Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, further augmented the definition of crimes
against humanity by specifying as a criminal in Art. 5(f), “institutionalized discrimination
on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights
and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population” and
“arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population.”47
Crimes against humanity would be the likely charge with regard to Northern
Ireland and Israel/Occupied Territories, even with the original limited definitions. In
both cases, an armed conflict has raged for decades. Even if the United Kingdom is
correct in its assertion that no armed conflict exists in Northern Ireland,48 crimes against
humanity are independent of international covenants, being derived from customary and
universal international law. Thus, as was recognized by the International Criminal Court
for Yugoslavia and International Criminal Court for Rwanda, a widespread or systematic
commission of these crimes should propel them to the international stage, regardless of
national law. At the very least, the questions become arguable and should be addressed
by all parties involved in order to reach a resolution that would be amenable to most and
reparative to all.
The most likely suspects in the “subjugated populace/terrorist”—“hegemonic
government/terrorist” environment include murder, torture, deportation and persecutions
and institutional discrimination.

47
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1.

MURDER

In general, the Geneva Conventions seem to require “parties to any ‘armed
conflict not of an international character’ to apply, ‘as a minimum’, certain standards to
‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’.”49 This includes “murder of all kinds.”50
While murder in general would merely be a humanitarian violation, systematic or
widespread murder recently has been elevated to a crime against humanity. This should
include systematic suicide bombings, car bombings, and assassination attempts, which
seem to have become commonplace in Israel/Occupied Territories.51 The International
Criminal Tribunals in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia included this crime in their statutes.52
In fact, in both statutes, it is the first crime listed.
2.

TORTURE

Torture has long been held a violation of customary law by virtue of its
universally atrocious nature. However, as a separate crime against humanity, it remains
relatively new. It appears on the lists of crimes against humanity and war crimes now,
thanks in part to the 1975 adoption of the Declaration on Protection from Torture by the
General Assembly of the United Nations.53 Each signatory must make torture a crime
under its penal code, and it must prosecute offenders.54 Conventional law status was

49
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attached to the act with the 1984 promulgation of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.55 Torture is defined as:
...[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.56

The physical and mental integrity of the person is often cited as a reason against
employing torture as an information gleaning device, as is the belief that evidence
obtained through its utilization would be unreliable.57 The Convention also states that “no
exceptional circumstances…may be invoked as a justification for torture…”58 In 1987,
the Landau Report recommended that security agents in Israel “exercise the use of
moderate physical and psychological pressure” on Palestinians suspected of security
offenses,59 but it was not until 1999 that the Israeli Supreme Court admonished the
practice. Israel was the last democratic country in the world to officially sanction the use
of torture.60
3.

DEPORTATION

The International Criminal Court as well as the ICTY and ICTR require a
widespread or systematic “attack” for an act to be considered a crime against humanity.
This expands the scope of “crime against humanity” to include acts outside of armed
55
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conflict as had been the case in the past. This attack, however, is not limited to a
“military attack and can include laws and administrative measures.”61 International law
has developed to “protect conquered and occupied populations against forced relocation
and internal displacement, obligations heightened during times of internal conflict.”62
Deportation includes “forcing people to leave an area in which they are lawfully
present, without grounds permitted under international law; deportation involves crossing
national frontiers and forcible transfers take place within national borders.”63
4.

PERSECUTION/INSTITUTIONALIZED DISCRIMINATION

According to the ICTY, “persecution is an act or omission committed against
someone on account of his or her race, religion, politics or ethnicity.”64 The ICTY statute
spoke required the offense be “‘political, racial and religious grounds’ (emphasis added),
whereas previous definitions required that an act be committed either on political, racial
or religious grounds.”65 However, the ICTY has refused to acknowledge the difference in
conjunction use.66 And the Code of Crimes adopted even broader perceptions of
persecution in Art. 5(f).
Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunals attempted to focus the blurred conception, to
which “persecution” gives rise by including: “deprivation of the rights to citizenship, to
teach, to practice professions, to obtain education, and to marry freely; arrest and
confinement, beatings, mutilation, and torture; deportation to ghettos; slave labor; and
61
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extermination.”67 Also, incorporated into the definition of persecution were acts that
seemed ‘Nazi-like.’ Concentration camps and “aryanization” were amongst those acts.68

B.

Crimes Against Humanity in Northern Ireland
1.

APPLICABLE STATE LAW

Currently, Northern Ireland has its own court system and parliament, but being
part of the United Kingdom permits the British government to exercise its sovereign right
to promote the security of its borders.69

The British government has used this

justification in order to derogate from accepted international law and agreements, namely
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.70
The British government has also promulgated its Terrorism Act of 2000, which is
its latest attempt to route out terrorism throughout the kingdom and its protectorates.71
This act extends and amends the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1996.72
The amendments attempt to strengthen evidence collection protections to citizens and
also attempt to increase the ability of the authorities to control terrorism.73 Terrorism is
defined as the use or threat of action “designed to influence the government or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and…the use or threat is made for the

67
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purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.”74 This includes violence
against any person, damage to property, endangerment of persons, or the creation of the
risk to health or safety of the public.75 Any action that would cause a persons property to
be forfeited through an information collection procedure can be heard by a court, and the
information collection cannot be implemented until that person has exhausted all means
of appeal.76
The act also proscribes certain organizations, such as the Irish Republican Army,
the Ulster Freedom Fighters, The Loyalist Volunteer Force, Al-Qa’ida, Islamic Jihad,
Hizballah, Hamas, etc.77 Membership in such organization subjects an individual to
criminal sanctions. 78 These organizations are granted appeal rights; a special commission
acts with regard to these appeals.79 In addition, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act supplements this act.80
Any property that is in the possession of a person when they are convicted of a
terrorism-related act is subject to forfeiture if the convicted person had intended to use or
had reasonable cause to suspect that his property would be used for terrorism.81
However, if another person makes a claim that the property in question is his, he must be
given the opportunity to be heard by the court before it makes its final order.82
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Further, any area may be cordoned off by a member of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary who is of the rank of superintendent or greater.83 This may be done if the
constable believes the measure “expedient for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.”84
This will only remain in effect for 28 days, but it may be extended by written request.85
In addition, if a person knows he might be of assistance to a terrorist
investigation, he must disclose that information to the authorities as soon as reasonably
practicable and failure to abide by this rule may subject that person to a prison term of up
to six months.86
The Terrorism Act of 2000 further permits arrest without warrant of an individual
reasonably suspected of being a terrorist.87

It permits the search of persons reasonably

believed to be terrorists88 as well as the search of premises if it is reasonably suspected
that a terrorist is to be found there89 or if it would be necessary for the preservation of
peace.90 Additionally, it would be an offense if one provided instruction or training in
making or use of firearms or explosives or if he received that training.91 And, it would be
an offense to collect information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing
for an act of terrorism.92
However, some safeguards have been extended. Thus, a suspect may only be held
up to four hours if no charge is forthcoming.93
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2.

ALLEGATIONS

Murder, torture and deportation have been the crimes against humanity most often
alleged as occurring in Northern Ireland. Throughout much of the last forty years,
various forms of republican paramilitary organizations, such as the Real Irish Republican
Army, have carried out what have been described as widespread and systematic bombing
campaigns directed at protestant northern Irish civilians.
These groups have been involved in many bombings like the 1998 bombing in
Omagh, which is now the subject of a police inquiry.94 Loyalist groups have also been
engaged in murder campaigns (although not bombings), such as cutting republican
civilians into small pieces.95 And, there have been reports of widespread governmental
aggression that has led to unarmed protesters being gunned down. Bloody Sunday is one
such incident.96
Additionally, the British army was arguably involved in the torturing of terrorist
suspects. It “used a combination of five ‘techniques’ (hooding, extended wall standing in
painful postures, loud noises, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink) to
interrogate suspects in an effort to obtain information to use against IRA terrorists.”97
The European Court for Human Rights classified these actions as inhumane and
degrading, yet not torture under the European Convention on Human Rights.98 However,
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both are prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.99
Moreover, complaints have arisen regarding deportation of suspected terrorists,
and there is a current possibility that a systematic deportation of civilian’s from the
United States to the United Kingdom could be classified as a crime against humanity.
The question revolves around whether these persons being deported due to suspicion of
the British government are singled out due to political ties and beliefs or due to true
terrorist activity.100 The act could be seen as systematic in that the British government
has recently concluded a treaty of alteration with the United States whereby judicial
review of deportation decisions would not be required.101 In the past there were
systematic attempts to cleanse Northern Irish neighborhoods of Catholics, to the extent
that some areas near Belfast were virtually Catholic-free.102
The point here is that whether these acts amounted to crimes against humanity has
not been addressed adequately by the European Court for Human Rights, as there is wide
disagreement as to whether the acts amounted to widespread murder, torture or
deportation. Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom have recognized this; the Belfast
Agreement and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry attempt to resolve the question through full
community participation and discourse. These disagreements strongly parallel those in
99
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Israel and the Occupied Territories, and the implementation of a plan of action has
strongly favored resolution.

C.

Crimes Against Humanity in Israel
1.

APPLICABLE STATE LAW

Israeli domestic law provides broad powers to military commanders who operate
within the occupied territories of Palestine.103 Those commanders can respond in a
flexible manner to “terrorist acts that impair the security of the population or threaten
public order.104 Those who advocate such powers say,
…[E]ven a democratic state, finding itself in a grave predicament, such as
the state of war, must equip its commanders with effective tools to provide an
immediate response to terrorist acts—including not only ‘sophisticated
weaponry’, but also legal tools that can provide for the immediate deterrence of
potential terrorists.105

And, the Israeli government has subscribed to this belief for much of the state’s
existence. It may be legitimate since Israel has been struggling against terrorism since it
was established.106
Israeli law permits administrative detention, as the occupied territories are
governed, not by civil/judiciary bodies, but by a Military force that has maintained the
states sovereignty since it expanded its territory following the Arab-Israeli and Six-days
wars.107 The military force is governed by a broad range of rules known as the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945.108

103

See Grebinar, supra note 37, at 274.
Id.
105
Id. at 275.
106
Id. at 261.
107
See generally id.
108
Id. at 265.
104

18

Regulations 108 and 111 authorized the military commander to detain a person if
he “believed it necessary for maintaining public order or securing public safety or state
security.”109 The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 confined the commanders
authority slightly by requiring a detention be the “sole” means of achieving a result; a
judge would invalidate it otherwise.110
Further limitations were promulgated in Annon v. Minister of Defence, when the
Supreme Court of Israel announced that every military administrative action would be
subject to judicial review.111
In addition, the Regulations also permit demolition of houses because the military
commander can confiscate land.112

The Supreme Court of Israel has held that

international law is irrelevant to the discharge of Regulation 119, which permits the
demolition and confiscation of property113 because it is part of domestic law. The court
required the military to respect proportionality and reasonableness when acting in
accordance with the Regulations.114
2.

ALLEGATIONS

Israeli interrogation practices parallel those of the British army in regard to
suspected terrorists; they include “prolonged standing or uncomfortable sitting positions,
tight hand or ankle cuffing, loud noise, sleep deprivation, hooding, cold rooms, and
violent shaking.”115 “The U.N. Committee Against Torture and the Special Rapporteur
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on Torture concluded that these practices are torture.”116 The Supreme Court of Israel
prohibited these acts, which until that point had been legal by Military Regulation.117
Thus, even if, as the European Court for Human Rights determined, these
interrogation tactics are merely inhumane and demeaning, a system must be established
to give a final determination and to give redress. That redress should go beyond the
military’s response, which was to cease promoting explicitly the physical extraction of
information. The point of a peace building mechanism is to answer questions heretofore
unanswerable and to bring recompense (if needed) and renewal. The Supreme Court of
Israel’s pronouncement provided none of this because the Palestinians are excluded from
the system, from which the court pronounces.
Because they are excluded from this system, widespread and systematic attacks
have been perpetrated by fringe-elements that see murder as the only option. Murder
would be classified as a crime against humanity in this instance because of the systematic
means that the fringe-groups use.
As the Geneva Conventions attempt to identify, collective punishment will not
effect change in this course of action, but it will provide a basis for prosecution of those
attempting to route-out this “terrorism.” A “state of emergency” with curfews, bypass
roads, educational controls, and economic restraints, for forty years, might reach the level
of an Apartheidic governmental structure.
“Since Apartheid was a state-wide system of racial discrimination, it is reasonable
to conclude that apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity under this category.118
The Nazis followed a similar path by:
116
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contributing to the process for singling out Jews for persecution by imposing collective
fines on the Jewish community; for signing decrees extending anti-Semitic legislation to
the newly occupied territories; for drafting and administering various decrees excluding
Jews from the social and economic sectors of German society…for signing a series of
119
decrees requiring…the deportation of Jews from occupied territory.

“The prohibition against racial discrimination is found in all the major international
human rights treaties and is universally recognized as a rule of customary international
law.”120
Further, Nuremberg Tribunal also included “offences against personal property as
would amount to an assault upon the health and life of a human being (such as the
burning of his house or depriving him of … his paid employment).”121 This seems to be
what happened in the Israeli/Palestinian case. Necessity has been cited, but as we have
seen, that is not a defense to crimes against humanity. These issues should be addressed
so both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples can achieve a sense of solace and begin to
reconnect their societies.

III.
A.

BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESSES

Northern Ireland
Attempts at reaching a peace agreement between the parties of the Northern

Ireland conflict reach almost as far back as the beginning of the conflict itself.122 The
road to peace has been complicated, with one side or another pulling out of talks nearly
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every time. In June 1973 the Northern Ireland Assembly was established.123 Protestants
and Catholics decided in the Sunningdale Agreement124 to share power on a new
Executive to address affairs within Northern Ireland.125 The agreement was rejected by
the Unionists126 and the Ulster Workers’ Council127 organized strikes upon its
approval.128 Eventually, resignations led to the downfall of the Executive.129 In 1985,
talks again led to an agreement, this time it was the Anglo-Irish Agreement.130 British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald signed the
agreement in November 1985 that gave the Irish Republic a consultative role in Northern
Ireland.131 After the agreement was signed, loyalist paramilitaries started a campaign of
violence in protest against it.132 A few months later, the Northern Ireland Assembly
dissolved.133
Talks between several political parties recommenced in 1992, but Unionists
withdrew from them after eight months.134 The Unionists also greatly opposed a meeting
in 1993 between then Prime Minister John Major and Social Democratic and Labour
Party leader John Hume.135 That meeting led to the Downing Street Declaration that
123
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stated that Sinn Fein (which had previously been left out of negotiations) could join
future talks on Northern Ireland only if the IRA renounced violence.136 On August 31,
1994 the IRA

announced a “complete cessation of military operations.”137

And

according to the agreement, Sinn Fein met with British officials in the months that
followed.138

The

year

that

followed

was

marked

by constant

battle over

decommissioning. The British refused to hold talks unless the republicans agreed to
disarm and the republicans refused to do so before talks were held.139 The IRA’s
ceasefire ended in 1996.140 Any discussions were bound to fail unless the IRA announced
another ceasefire, which they did in 1997.
Finally, in October 1997 all sides to the conflict sat down for talks at Stormont.141
During these talks, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that an independent judicial
inquiry would be established to investigate the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972.142 This
move by Blair undoubtedly helped to relieve some of the distrust among the parties.
While the inquiry has yet to promulgate its conclusions, it is clear that such an effort to
discover the truth has improved upon the peace process. What ensued was the Belfast
Agreement (commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement).143

From this

agreement, the Northern Ireland Assembly was established to address relations within
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Northern Ireland.144 Decisions made by this body are to reflect the positions of both sides
of the society.

145

The North-South Ministerial Council was also created in the

agreement.146 This entity handles relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland. Finally, the British-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference was established to
maintain open communications between the United Kingdom and Ireland.147 Also
included in the Belfast Agreement was a pact that called for immediate
decommissioning.148
The Agreement also established the Equality and Human Rights Commissions
and called for full examinations of criminal justice and policing in Northern Ireland.149
According to the agreement, all segments of the community are to participate in the
Assembly.150 The parties also agreed to an early release of terrorist prisoners from both
sides.151 The agreement was put to a referendum in May 1998 and overwhelmingly
approved; Assembly elections were held in September.152
The approval of the agreement has not meant a cure for the issues that have
plagued Northern Ireland for decades. Implementing the agreement has been difficult at
best and it is far too early to know if this agreement is the solution to Northern Ireland’s
problems. Bombings have not stopped altogether since the agreement was made and the
decommissioning process has been painfully slow. The IRA has occasionally decided that
144
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they would not disarm.153 Recently, they finally began the process of decommissioning.
Each side has frequently accused the other side of not fulfilling its portion of the
agreement.154 The release of prisoners has caused further controversy and delays.155
In addition, a truth commission known as the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was created
to determine the true cause of the 1972 slaying of 13 unarmed protesters by British
forces.156 The Inquiry is to “explore what really happened during the Troubles.”157 The
process of making amends for crimes against humanity that occurred during the Troubles
has taken hold and the families of victims “still want to learn the full facts of what
happened.”158
The crimes were committed over such a long period and the lives of civilians in
Northern Ireland were disrupted for so long that there is a belief that an “over-arching
process to look into the whole violent history would be the best way to deal with the
past.”159
B.

Israel and the Occupied Territories
Crimes against humanity take place every day in Israel and the Occupied

Territories. Whenever the Israeli army destroys Palestinian homes in attempt to find
terrorists, they are committing persecutions as well as property crimes. Each time a
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Palestinian straps a bomb to his (and now her160) chest and wanders into a crowded
marketplace, they are committing murder. Deportation is another crime against humanity
that is at the center of this conflict.
In 2003, the Israeli army began a large-scale destruction of Palestinian homes at a
refugee camp in Rafah, Gaza Strip.161 The action caused hundreds to be without
homes.162 It was taken in the name of security, but searches following the devastation
have turned up no weapons.163
There have been several attempts at forming a peace plan between the Israelis and
Palestinians. The Oslo I agreement was signed in 1993 and was composed of two
stages.164 The first stage was designed to build good faith between the parties through
mutual recognition, Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Palestinian
administration in specific areas and a cessation of violence by the Palestinians.165 After
such conditions were maintained for a period of five years final negotiations could begin
that would confirm borders for the Palestinian state, settle the question of Jerusalem, deal
with Israeli settlements and Palestinian refugees.166 Unfortunately, neither side honored
its part of the deal.167
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The Oslo II agreement was signed in 1995 and intended to increase Palestinian
autonomy.168 Unfortunately, before any parts of the agreement could be implemented,
then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an orthodox Jew who was
against the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.169 Bus bombings by Palestinians then
reinitiated.170
The Roadmap to Peace in the Middle East was drawn up in 2003 by the United
States, European Union, the Russian Federation and the United Nations and those four
players would assist in the implementation of the peace plan.171 The two-state solution
was broken into three phases. The first phase, initially planned to be completed by May
2003, was to include an end to the violence and terrorism that has plagued the region, a
normalization of Palestinian life and the creation of Palestinian institutions.172 These
measures involved the Israeli government improving the humanitarian crisis that the
Palestinians find themselves in. And, this phase also called for Israel to dismantle
settlement outposts established since March 2001 within the Occupied Territories.173 The
second phase of the roadmap was to create an independent Palestinian state with
temporary borders and a certain level of sovereignty by December 2003.174 Statehood
was to be contingent upon the Palestinians having strong leadership opposed to terrorist
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activity.175 The problem with this requirement is that it is completely subjective. Israeli
authorities could easily suggest that one suicide bombing indicates that the Palestinian
leadership supports terrorism. Finally, the third phase of the roadmap offers permanent
status to the Palestinian state, a solution to the refugee issue that has been created
throughout the conflict and end to the conflict by 2005; a tidy presumption.176 The
timeline for the roadmap is completely arbitrary. It is nearly impossible to put such time
limits on such a volatile conflict.177 This is not to mention the fact that many
requirements within the roadmap are vague and subject to the interpretation of the parties
involved. It would be difficult for Palestinian leaders to agree to a peace plan with vague
terms for statehood since they would have no idea what the Palestinian state would entail.
The roadmap has failed to work mainly because the Israeli government will have
nothing to do with the plan until the suicide bombings stop, which they have not. The
cyclical nature of this conflict is the most significant obstruction to protecting residents of
both Israel and the Occupied Territories from crimes against humanity. Since 2000, when
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Noble Sanctuary (as it is known to
Muslims) or the Temple Mount (as it is known to Jews), suicide bombings have been
followed Israeli strikes which again have been followed by suicide bombings.178 It
appears as if the suicide bombings will never cease since they are always in response to
Israeli force, which is exercised after a previous suicide bombing. If the cycle never
175
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stops, peace will never be achieved and both sides will continue to use excessive force
and illegal tactical manoeuvres.

IV.
A.

MODEL FOR ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN RECOVERY

Proposal for Israel/Occupied Territories
The crimes against humanity that have occurred during the most recent years in

Israel and the Occupied Territories have been horrendous. The cycle of violence and
degradation that exists between these two peoples seems to have no end in sight. Unless a
concrete peace agreement can be established that outlines the exact specifications for a
Palestinian state and unless the Palestinian suicide bombings are stopped, the crimes
against humanity will continue.
Regardless of the fact that war crimes may have been committed within
Ireland/Northern Ireland or Israel/Occupied Territories, their divergent political climates
have produced greatly variant reactions by both the international community and national
agendas. However, a common legal mechanism must be adopted.
To some extent, the Irish process has progressed further than the Middle East's.
Although there have been conflicts amongst and between groups in both of these
localities for extended periods of time, true, widespread conflict did not erupt until the
late 1960s and early 1970s.179 They proceeded through times of greater and lesser
tension, only to arrive at peace agreements, which were then disrupted by violence (often
from every faction).
Recent peace agreements, the Belfast Agreement and the Roadmap for Peace have
had varying levels of success. And, as the opposing forces sing self-laudatory praises for
179
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their successes and cast dismal rebukes of their adversaries for their failures, war crimes
have been perpetrated, justified and repeated.180
The solution is clear.

Any plan must provide increased avenues of open

communication, a sense of solace with a coordinate sense of security for victims, and
specific, precise structure to address Israeli/Palestinian relations for the future.

An

approach combining the Belfast Agreement together with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry will
serve as a useful, but imperfect, four-part model as both have attempted to address
problems of security, mutual understanding and rights of victims. This proposal includes:
1) a combination Truth Commission/Quasi-National War Crimes Tribunal (Commission);
2) an Equality and Human Rights Council (Council); 3) an Executive Assembly
(Assembly); and 4) Community Building Bodies (CBBs).

B.

Alternative Mechanisms
1.

NATIONAL TRIALS

“Domestic legal systems remain the primary fora for holding individuals
accountable” for crimes against humanity.181 This is probably so because it is the closest
administrative level to the occurrences. The national court system in a state where a
crime against humanity purportedly occurred can be better equipped to obtain evidence
and witnesses because it controls the police powers at the local level to provide
enforcement.
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In addition, national trials fit well with the international law concepts of
jurisdiction. If a crime occurred within a state or its effect was immediately felt within
the state, the general rule is that the state should have jurisdiction.182 And, states have
jurisdiction over offenders who are their nationals and in cases where “extraterritorial
conduct would have an actually or potentially harmful effect on important interests of the
state.”183
However, states that wish to try these cases themselves must have domestic
criminal law statutes implementing their obligation to prosecute.184 A judiciary is only as
good as its ability to operate, and while greater access to evidence, witnesses, victims,
and perpetrators185 might be encouraging, the system has to function in order to realize
any gain from that advantage.

Israeli law is just that, Israeli. Because the proper

functioning of the system is dependent on an agreeable corpus of law, it would be
difficult to get Palestinian cooperation with trials prosecuting laws which they might feel
would strongly favor Israelis. This is bolstered by the fact that the Occupied Territories
function under military regulations and minor local rules rather than any type of national
law.
Under normal circumstances, a national judiciary would be able to try these types
of cases in a more cost-effective manner; however, the Occupied Territories are ruled by
military commanders whose decisions are merely subject to review by Israeli courts. In
order for trials to have legitimacy, they would have to include Palestinian systems. This
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necessity makes national courts no more cost-effective than a hybrid Israeli/Palestinian
judiciary.
Furthermore, national trials would normally permit more of a connection with the
proceedings to be felt by the population,186 but there are two nations involved here:
Palestinian and Israeli. Israelis would not feel connected to a Palestinian system because
they probably would not feel comfortable traveling within those territories and might feel
the court is skewed against them. Palestinians, on the other hand, would have a similar
reaction to Israeli national trials and these could fragment the society more by inciting
fringe elements who might think their cause was not being preserved.
Finally, since “serious violations are usually committed on behalf of or with the
complicity of the state,” truly independent judiciaries and political cultures less tolerant
of human rights abuses must be developed. 187 This can make a national judiciary truly
ineffective and it parallels the dysfunction that a mere Palestinian national court would
face in that it would be lacking in appropriate numbers of trained judges and attorneys,
adequate infrastructure and a “culture of respect for the fairness and impartiality of the
process and rights of the accused.”188

2.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

If a crime is so “heinous” as to be harmful to the world population in general, it is
said that any state can take jurisdiction to prosecute it.189 Crimes against humanity would
be included in the list of offenses that justify this “universal jurisdiction.”190 Most states
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believe that offenses relating to their persons, territory, or security should be tried by their
courts.
However, because crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction,
that does not necessitate their prosecution within in an international arena. A national,
international, or hybrid court system can function properly as well. The main force
behind the choice of jurisdiction is whether it can ensure the crimes, attempts to commit
them, and complicity in their commission are offenses that carry punishment by the
appropriate penalties.191
In the case of Israel and the Occupied Territories legitimacy of the court is very
important due to the politically charged debates surrounding the situation. A tribunal
with international character would exude a perception of legitimacy. Crimes against
humanity have been developing through customary and conventional law for the better
part of a century, and using them in a case as high profile as the Israeli/Palestinian
question would provide a much needed foundation of support, which would be looked
upon well by the international community since it has worked hard to define more clearly
crimes against humanity law.
Also, as pointed out above, national trials in this context would most likely be
ineffective and possibly detrimental. However, the United Nations may be “suffering
from tribunal fatigue.”192 This would make it more difficult to get the momentum of the
international political machine churning. And, as some have noted, situations with a high
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level of political significance may make it impossible for the Security Council to take any
action.193
Further, if the necessary political machinery were geared up, legitimacy would
again be challenged as to the impartiality of a system so politically charged.

The

question would have to be asked whether the court would have the ability to acquit a
defendant. If the international community is truly concerned about the legitimacy of
international law over that of the court’s legitimacy, an acquittal might just bring down
the house of cards that international crimes against humanity law and enforcement might
be.
A hybrid court on the other hand, would have less political machinery to move. It
could save legitimacy by maintaining an all inclusive atmosphere and it would have the
ability to enforce its judgments, which is lacking in international courts.
C.

Benefits of Truly Holistic and Comprehensive Plan
1.

TRUTH COMMISSION/QUASI-NATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

As with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, a truth commission would be established.
This would serve to elicit facts of underreported, unreported, and previously unknown
incidents of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It would work in conjunction with
a quasi-national war crimes tribunal. The war crimes tribunal would be composed of four
justices, two Palestinians and two Israelis, and they should decide cases based on
international and national law by simple majority, with particular procedures in the case
of a stalemate. The composition of the tribunal justices would ensure fair and unbiased
trials. The injured persons and injured societies need to see that justice is being done in
the same vein as security is being restored, and an equal number of justices from each
193

Id.

34

camp (and without foreign intervention) will ensure magnanimous results, which each
side would see as fair and free of prejudice.
In addition, the tribunal would hear and try cases addressing war crimes
perpetrated by and upon both sides, and it would investigate and prosecute suspected war
criminals of every rank. This process would function in conjunction with the truth
commission. Further, and in an effort to promote the collection of knowledge regarding
the war crimes and crimes against humanity caused during the past 60 years, the truth
commission would have amnesty granting powers. Individuals could voluntarily discuss
their experiences that involved war crimes, or suspected war criminals could petition the
commission for amnesty from prosecution by the tribunal or reduced sentences in
exchange for clear, probative information.
Although potentially a political stumbling block, amnesty granting power remain
necessary as an information gathering tool, just as they were in South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.194 Reconciliation is a process; one mechanism will not
create cross-community legitimacy.195 As in Northern Ireland, there are weaknesses in
the criminal justice system that need to be supplemented, as the courts cannot be skewed
or seen as skewed toward any one side. Also, as in Northern Ireland, there was no
“clear” discrediting of a government or system of government that brought about the
commission.196 Thus, this new tactic should effectively supplement the process that the
trials commence.
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2.

EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

An equality and human rights council would be established. Similar to the Belfast
Agreement, it would examine the criminal justice and policing mechanisms available and
in use in the Occupied Territories. In many cases, the war crimes perpetrated against
Palestinians by Israeli troops and against Israelis by Palestinian militants were
precipitated by harsh, conditions that prior “one-size-fits-all” security arrangements
created. The commission would attempt to judge security threats based on competent
information and would hold impartiality as its cornerstone in order to limit the role of
politics in its reactions to certain situations.
The Belfast Agreement concentrated its beginning stages on lessening the
violence in Northern Ireland before proceeding further towards peace.197 And, likewise,
the Roadmap for Peace required that violence stop before normalization of life for
Palestinians could occur.198 While this process has seemed to work in Northern Ireland, it
has been a long straining course of developments, which have, in a number of instances,
required great strength in moving forward despite deadly bombing attacks by forces
opposed to the peace process.199 The Roadmap’s Phase I, which requires cessation of
violence before Palestinian life can be terminated is a non sequitur as the great majority
of the Palestinian populace is not involved in terrorist attacks. The Occupied Territories,
however dangerous and insecure, require detailed and particularized assessments which
do not trample on the rights of residents. The Roadmap’s Phase I acknowledges the war
197
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crimes of over-aggressive tactics, persecution, and property crimes in addition to the fact
that it arguably violates the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which circumscribe the use of collective punishment.200
The Equality and Human Rights Commission would attempt to ensure that the
rights and liberties of a collective population are not withheld, that their lives are not
made “non-normal,” as a result of certain sporadic and vindictive militant elements.
Because terrorist activity is recognized to come from extreme factions within a society,201
it is unwarranted and impedes the peace process to react with “politically correct”
ruthlessness to attacks. The commission would attempt to react in the most reasoned and
reserved manner practicable without political influence.
3.

EXECUTIVE ASSEMBLY

Northern Ireland’s Assembly was created by the Belfast Agreement in order to
devolve some governmental powers to both the Protestants and Catholics.202 In the past,
much of the controversy arose over demographic problems, such as protestant attempts to
exclude the Catholic majority from political power through strategic gerrymandering.203
The new Assembly attempted to create some level of power sharing. This proposal
would attempt to promote mutual respect and collective functioning amongst the Israelis
and the Palestinians. They would not necessarily live in the same communities (although
the ultimate goal is mutual inclusion), but they would be able to make collaborative
efforts to make positive changes in the reason. The Palestinian occupied regions of the
200
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Territories have been estimated to have two-thirds to three-quarters of the population
unemployed, with most of those persons living under the UN designated poverty line of
$2 per day.204

Such a collaborative effort as a Joint Assembly for the Occupied

Territories would alleviate such problems to a degree as well as assist Israel and Jewish
settlers in obtaining much needed water in Palestinian Occupied soils. This proposed
assembly would make mutual decisions on local issues that currently are made by Israeli
Military Administrators on a “cookie cutter” basis, which has failed to work in any truly
effective way.
4.

COMMUNITY BUILDING BODIES

Joint Palestinian/Israeli relations in the future are even more important than those
in place at the time of the agreement. A community atmosphere will not merely appear
because an agreement is made. Bodies must be established which would take this reality
into account and assist the above mentioned Assembly in cultivating mutual respect for
one another as well as cultivating a system whereby an agreement reached between the
parties will survive in its functional capacity.
The Roadmap for Peace provided certain protections and procedures, but they
were set in a subjective light.205 Each side determined whether the other was complying
on its own accord. In fact, a recent suicide bombing on March 15, 2004 prompted Ariel
Sharon, Israel’s current Prime Minister to refuse to negotiate with the Palestinians.206
The Roadmap permits Israel to walk away from negotiations if it feels, in its own
political scheme, that the Palestinian cause is led by terrorist forces (indirectly or
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directly).207 Vague requirements such as this would have to be eliminated to the best of
the factions’ abilities, but when writing an agreement prospectively it is nearly
impossible to eliminate all vagaries. To combat this, the bodies created to shepherd the
Israelis and the Palestinians to lasting peace would be able to make declaratory
judgments regarding agreement language and interpretation as well as foster ongoing
negotiations in order to work through troubles. The Belfast Agreement is more time
conscious than the Roadmap. Problems have persisted in Northern Ireland,208 but the
parties have persisted in their commitment for peace over the long term.209 However, the
Roadmap for Peace, signed in 2003, projected peace by 2005.210 A limitation on time
cannot be placed on the attainment of lasting peace, which is, after all, the ultimate goal
here.
In order to get Israel and the Occupied Territories prompted for a lasting peace
and implementation of a peace agreement, a timeline might be used as a guideline, but it
cannot be proclaimed. Beyond the impact of a timeline, however, the parties have to be
truly ready to commit to the agreement; to commit to peace. Evidence of this is that war
crimes and crimes against humanity need to be discontinued. This applies to all sides in
the matter; the Israelis cannot expect the Palestinians (however few of them) to lay down
their arms without an actual commitment from the Israeli Military Administration of life
normalization. There needs to be some degree of trust (or a leap of faith) on both sides in
order for an agreement to be implemented effectively.

There cannot be collective
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punishment, there cannot be suicide bombings, there cannot be hostage takings, there
cannot be internment. Both sides must release the prisoners they hold which are “thought
maybe to have possibly been involved” in a war crime. To accomplish this there must be
a return to the rules of law enforcement and an end to the rules of war. Deportations
must stop and decommissioning must begin.
Difficulties do remain, however. One of the main weaknesses of finding an
agreement with the necessary independence to be effective is that it must find financial
support.

Who will pay for the investigations, trials, commissions and community

building bodies? That question has to be worked out in the negotiations, but it is sure to
be a central point as the Occupied Territories are some of the poorest regions in the
world.

Israel’s long-time supporter, the United States,211 may need to continue its

assistance, but that limits Israel’s ability to react to terrorists (especially since September
11, 2001) in a manner other than through force.
In addition, mere truth commissions and war crimes tribunals might not seem
sufficient to the Jewish settlers or Palestinian residents who feel they were wronged by
their opposition. They may clamor for reparations or some other form of restitution;
however, it is unlikely that any agreement or peace plan would include these, as both
sides have felt their actions were justified to some degree. Furthermore, asking for
reparations or aid might re-ignite an already shaken and volatile community’s emotions.

V.
CONCLUSION
The Israeli/Palestinian situation is complicated. To that end, any solution for the
allegations of crimes against humanity requires a multi-faceted approach.
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heinousness of widespread or systematic murder, torture, deportation, and persecution
require specific plans to route out their perpetrators, provide solace to victims, and to
provide reconciliation.

Regardless of whether these crimes can be proven, their

allegation necessitates reaction and resolution. Hardly a time comes when it is perfectly
clear whether a crime has in fact been committed.
Thus, following the model of Northern Ireland’s process of addressing allegations
of crimes against humanity, one is able to develop a structure that does the same for
Israel and the Occupied Territories. Both situations revolved around violence in light of
religion, politics, and property rights. And, each had a marginalized people desperate for
change. A truth commission, quasi-national tribunal, equality and human rights council,
executive assembly and community building bodies may provide the necessary building
blocks to accompany the two nations on their path toward survival, reconciliation and
prosperity.
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